There are gaps in board assurance on technical and operational risk in mining. There are gaps in current environmental social governance (ESG) 
Introduction
Mining company directors are responsible for setting the company goals, appointing the CEO, oversight of the company's management including management of risk, and reviewing at reasonable intervals the company's progress towards attaining its goals (Baxt 2012, p. 111) . It is also the board's responsibility to set the company's 'risk appetite' (the type and level of risks it is prepared to tolerate). According to ISO 31000:2018 (International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 2018), risk is the 'effect of uncertainty on objectives'.
"The independence of the board establishes the ability of the corporation to uphold its responsibilities to third parties when they conflict with the interests of shareholders" (Mayer 2013 ). The independence of boards, with the right diversity of thought and skills balance to ask the right questions at the right time, is something shareholders and regulators expect and are constantly monitoring, particularly on management of risk and on timely and balanced disclosure, as outlined by the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX 2014a).
When mining disasters happen, the mining industry, as a whole, loses a degree of its social licence to operate (SLTO), which is essentially permission from governments, communities, staff, customers and suppliers to undertake particular activities. When SLTO is lost, government permits are revoked or not approved, resource nationalism escalates where gross inequity is suspected, and staff turnover and strikes become common or the industry cannot recruit new professionals. Suppliers and/or customers may boycott the company if certain standards are not perceived to be upheld (e.g. environmental and social governance (ESG)). Loss of SLTO can be due to specific reasons (e.g. tailings storage facility (TSF) failures or rockfalls where miners are entrapped or killed) or unspecific reasons (e.g. pattern of avoiding meeting social and economic obligations in countries of operation).
Many mine accidents and disasters are due to geotechnical engineering issues, including:
 Tailings  Seismicity, e.g. Cadia 2017 (Dyson 2017 Newcrest Mining Limited 2018) .
 Airblast, e.g. Northparkes 1999 (SIMTARS 1999; DMP 2000b; Bailey 2003; Hebblewhite 2003) .
Non-geotechnical engineering issues, such as poor ventilation, fire and explosion, also feature highly in mine disaster literature (e.g. Pike River, 2010 (Panckhurst et al. 2012) and Moura, 1994 (Hair 2016 ) and many more including inundation/inrush, machinery incidents, electrocution, falls from height and entrapment in confined spaces (Quinlan 2014, pp. 12 and 84) .
As part of a concerted national effort to protect and enhance the Australian mining industry's reputation for world's best practice in terms of productivity, safety, health, environment and communities (HSEC) performance, Australian mines safety legislation was to be harmonised, but harmonised safety legislation is yet to eventuate (Atkins et al. 2016 ). The only thing that is relatively standard across the country is compliance with (non-mandatory) international standards for safety and risk management and the industry's requirement for itself and its service providers to be certified for: The purpose of the Standards is to:
 Guide adherence with the mandatory elements of the International Professional Practices Framework.
 Provide a framework for performing and promoting a broad range of value-added internal auditing services.
 Establish the basis for the evaluation of internal audit performance.
 Foster improved organisational processes and operations.
The Standards are a set of principles-based, mandatory requirements consisting of:
 Statements of core requirements for the professional practice of internal auditing and for evaluating the effectiveness of performance that are internationally applicable at organisational and individual levels. It provides a comprehensive framework that assists enterprises in achieving their objectives for the governance and management of enterprise IT. Simply stated, it helps enterprises create optimal value from IT by maintaining a balance between realising benefits and optimising risk levels and resource use. COBIT 5 enables IT to be governed and managed in a holistic manner for the entire enterprise, taking in the full end-to-end business and IT functional areas of responsibility, considering the IT-related interests of internal and external stakeholders. COBIT 5 is generic and useful for enterprises of all sizes, whether commercial, not-for-profit or in the public sector.
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI 2013)
The GRI promotes the use of sustainability reporting as a way for organisations to become more sustainable and contribute to a sustainable global economy. GRI's mission is to make sustainability reporting standard practice. To enable all companies and organisations to report their economic, environmental, social and governance performance, GRI produces free sustainability reporting guidelines.
The AICD's director update (AICD 2018a) gives a general, contemporary feel for what draws the attention of directors. It is a long list of topics which, if managed according to the advice, will keep most lawyers and accountants busy. What's missing from the AICD's director updates and from the list of standards above is guidance on assurance of mining specific technical and operational risk. This leaves a huge gap in the current assurance framework for most mining company board audit and risk committees and their assurance providers. There also appears to be no training for mining experts to create this service in tandem with the financial and legal assurance traditionally provided.
Environmental social governance and the global reporting initiative
Global leadership from people like the CEO of Blackrock (the world's largest asset manager with USD 6 trillion in assets), Larry Fink, has increased pressure on companies around the world to lift standards on ESG (which includes safety and risk management). (Fink 2018) .
ESG is also well articulated by the ICMM. "In May 2008, member companies committed to report on their sustainable development performance in line with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. In 2013, member companies reaffirmed their support for GRI by committing to report in accordance with the core option of GRI's G4 guidelines" (ICMM 2018; GRI 2013 GRI , 2015 GRI , 2018 . For those who don't know, GRI G4 is a guideline of reporting principles and standard disclosures for informing markets and societies on sustainability matters. It is called G4 as it is the fourth update of the GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI 2015). Mining and metals sector specific disclosures are also required (GRI 2013). The "Global Reporting Initiative framework is the most commonly adopted international framework (72 companies)" (AICD 2018a, p. 14).
What's in the GRI-G4 assurance?
ESG reporting and assurance is mainly focussed on services provided by the Big 4 accounting firms. These tend to be based on audits against standards for the topics summarised below (GRI 2018):
 Occupational health and safety (International Labour Organization Convention 176 (ILO 1995)).
 Emergency preparedness.
 Environment.
 Compliance with laws and regulations.
 Resettlement and closure planning.
 Emissions.
 Climate change and/or carbon management (implicit).
 Human rights and indigenous rights.
 Industrial relations and collective bargaining.
 Anti-corruption and anti-competitive behaviour.
 Economic benefits to the jurisdiction/community.
 Diversity, equal opportunity and equal pay.
 Materials stewardship.
There are so many categories and it is not surprising that audit and risk committees struggle to provide appropriate oversight over the effective management of technical and operational risks associated with the act of mining.
ESG in mature, multinational mining companies
Companies such as BHP, Rio Tinto, South 32, Glencore, Newcrest, Newmont, etc. have mature governance frameworks that comply with ESG guidance (set out in exchange listing rules such as on the NYSX and LSX). These mature companies are also signatories to various public commitments and are voluntarily committed to other initiatives, such as the ICMM, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and UN Global Compact (Figure 1 ). These frameworks promulgate the GRI Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which major multinationals transparently report against in order to obtain high GRI scores from ratings agencies (5 stars being the best). These ratings are used by ethical investment groups such as university endowment funds, pension funds, venture capital groups and banks to determine who should receive funding and at what weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The implication is that it should be easier and cheaper to obtain investment if your company has a high GRI score. The KPIs reported may also be linked to executive pay in these organisations, driving better executive behaviour through the hip pocket.
Proxy advisers (e.g. CGI Glass Lewis, Ownership Matters and ISS) have a significant influence on mining company annual general meeting voting outcomes. If a mining company has poor ESG practices and/or transparency, proxy advisers influence shareholders to vote against certain board resolutions. In a worst case scenario, some proxy advisers (e.g. ISS) can instigate class action litigation on behalf of shareholders if a company is seen to have made gross errors of judgement which could have been avoided with more mature governance and through greater diligence of directors.
CGI Glass Lewis (Doyle 2018, p. 18) states:
"When a substantial environmental or social risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against responsible members of the risk committee or its equivalent (including an environmental or sustainability committee), or in favour of a shareholder proposal that addresses the company's failure to address such risks, particularly around providing more disclosure and reporting regarding the risk and related mitigation initiatives".
GRI ESG reporting is a worthy global initiative but it has holes. More work needs to be done to educate assurance providers, directors and proxy advisers on the need for mining deep domain experts to provide independent assurance on whether companies are managing the disaster-causing risks of mining, such as geotechnical engineering risks.
Figure 1 Example of voluntary initiatives and public commitments made by tier 1 mining companies (BHP 2017, p. 9)
A commercial motivator for ESG reporting is the link between strong ESG and a lower WACC. A lower WACC means a lower discount rate applied to valuations, resulting in higher valuations which lead to higher share prices (Ker 2018b) . The incentive for mining executives to obtain high ESG scores may have led to the ESG system being focussed on things which are easy to measure, but there is a saying: "Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted" (Gittins 2018) . This is why mining STEM professionals with deep domain expertise are important -they know what counts.
What does good technical and operational risk assurance look like?

Risk-intelligent companies follow nine principles (Deloitte 2009) (Figure 2):
A common definition of risk, which addresses both value preservation and value creation, is used consistently throughout the organisation.
A common risk framework supported by appropriate standards is used throughout the organisation to manage risks.
Key roles, responsibilities and authority relating to risk management are clearly defined and delineated within the organisation.
A common risk management infrastructure is used to support the business units and functions in the performance of their risk responsibilities.
Governing bodies (e.g. boards, audit committees, etc.) have appropriate transparency and visibility into the organisation's risk management practices to discharge their responsibilities.
Executive management is charged with primary responsibility for designing, implementing and maintaining an effective risk program.
Business units are responsible for the performance of their business and the management of risks they take within the risk framework established by executive management.
Certain functions (e.g. HR, finance, IT, tax, legal, etc.) have a pervasive impact on the business and provide support to the business units as it relates to the organisation's risk program.
Certain functions (e.g. internal audit, risk management, compliance, etc.) provide objective assurance as well as monitor and report on the effectiveness of an organisation's risk program to governing bodies and executive management.
Figure 2 Nine principles of a risk-intelligent enterprise (Deloitte 2009)
This paper focuses on principles 5 and 9, which is the board's role in maintaining a degree of ownership of risk and thus resourcing an appropriate level of internal audit, external audit and assurance activities. Although the Big 4 accounting firms' suggestions on risk management are sound, in practice they fail to deliver any kind of assurance on technical and operational risk in mining. For example, when undertaking independent auditor's reports, external auditors must provide a narrative on key audit matters (KAMs) (AASB 2015), which are meant to cover any material risks for the company which may have an adverse material financial impact. KAMs could arguably include commentary on the Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC) Code (JORC 2012) compliance (as required by ASX Listing Rules and Chapter 5 (ASX 2013, ASX 2014b) of the mineral resource and ore reserve upon which the mining company's valuation is partly based (as well as on property plant and equipment, goodwill, cash, etc.).
If risk control matrices (RCMs) on JORC compliance (explained in 4.1) were created as part of the assurance process (which they generally are not), technical and operational risk could be appropriately considered at that point, using independent expert reports. If this process was undertaken, there would be greater consideration given to what could go wrong and the impact this may have on the company's ability to meet market guidance, its triple bottom line, reputation and risk of litigation. This would then provide impetus for the board to ensure appropriate resources are made available to manage these risks.
One method used by internal audit functions for provision of assurance of effective management of risk is the three lines of defence (3LoD) assurance mapping.
Three lines of defence
Auditors use processes known as 3LoD board assurance and RCM to map out key risks, key controls and their effectiveness assessments. "When used in conjunction with assurance maps, a documented '3 Lines of Defence' model can help inform the Board of Directors, Audit Committee and Senior Management how well the organisation's assurance functions are operating" (IIA 2018). The first line of defence is "concerned with management controls and generally has a real-time focus" (IIA 2018). The second line of defence "centres on risk oversight and involves some degree of real-time activity, with a mandate to review 1st Line of Defence activities" (IIA 2018) . The third line of defence "involves independent assurance that evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness of both 1st Line and 2nd Line risk management approaches" (IIA 2018) (Figure 3 ).
Figure 3 Three lines of defence (Deloitte 2016)
For specific geotechnical risks, 3LoD and/or RCM assurance could be provided for specific geotechnical risks such as TSF stability, seismicity risk management, ground control management (i.e. to prevent rockfalls and pit slips), mine fill management (i.e. to prevent paste/hydraulic fill inrushes), etc.
Greater transparency on key controls effectiveness for prevention of the types of incidents that can lead to mine disasters would significantly improve board attention and could serve as evidence of due diligence when defending directors if an adverse event should occur. It could be argued that the ICMM's Health & Safety Critical Control Management Guide (ICMM 2015) already sets out a process to provide assurance (verification) of critical controls. While it is a good document, it covers critical controls for all material unwanted events (MUEs) from a statistical analysis of past accidents ( Figure 4 ) and does not go into any detail on each risk or the competencies of those who must provide the assurance/verification for each type of MUE. It is possible that assurance can become a simplistic, tick box exercise if carried out by unqualified people using generic guidance.
Understanding mining risk requires technical and operational expertise from risk-trained mining engineering, life-of-mine planning, geotechnical engineering, geology and metallurgy experts. These professionals need to work alongside traditional assurance providers to develop new ways to provide transparency, accountability and assurance to mining company boards. Risks are never definite, so market disclosure of these risks may not be required, per ASX Listing Rules 3.1 and 3.1A (ASX 2013, n.d.) but they should certainly be proactively managed. This requires appropriate resources (i.e. access to mining expertise either in-house or as consultants). Competency framework -how will future skills impact mines safety and productivity? Quinlan (2014) and Kenner (2009) note the importance of the competency framework for managers and regulators of mines as a major factor in preventing mine disasters. Reduction of competency requirements was identified as a major causal factor of the Pike River (Panckhurst et al. 2012) and Beaconsfield (Chandler 2009 ) disasters.
The digital transformation of mining brings new risks to the mining industry, including that mines are increasingly going to be designed and managed by non-traditional disciplines who are domain experts in autonomous operations, artificial intelligence, cyber risk and other ICT related fields. How can we be sure those who design, run and regulate our mines have appropriate expertise to ensure lessons from the past are not lost but also to ensure risks inherent in the digital mine are being appropriately identified and managed?
Artificial intelligence, machine learning and cyber risk
The digital mine will be significantly automated and interconnected thanks to the convergence of information technology (IT) and operational technology (i.e. IT-OT convergence) enabling real-time engineered data science (artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML)) optimisation via improved communications infrastructure, with all machines and platforms accessible through the cloud/internet. Holistic optimisation and removal of siloes will result in more efficient, better managed mines where risks are more thoroughly and expediently mitigated, as long as the technology is working. It is hoped the digital transformation of mining, which includes automation, will improve assurance of technical and operational risks from the safety of remote operation centres. Quinlan (2014, p. 39) states that infrequently revised laws have "failed to keep pace with changes in work including changes in technology and work organisation". With AI/ML increasingly enabling systems and processes to become automated, there needs to be ongoing change risk management around the boundaries of AI/ML and human expert decision-making. AI expert Tegmark (2017) highlights the risk of allowing AI/ML to have total control and Good (1965) , as quoted in Tegmark (2017, p. 134) , states: "the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control". There is also the risk posed by hackers who may override systems and change algorithms. What are the technical and operational risks associated with detected and undetected external interference with mining systems? What does good cyber risk management look like in a connected mine? Are the right people involved with systems design and oversight?
Conclusion
There are gaps in the current auditing framework and board assurance for management of technical and operational risk in mining. For the mining industry to retain its SLTO, board level assurance of technical and operational risks -not just legal and financial risks -is imperative. In order to do this, mining company boards and executive teams must have appropriate representation of mining experts in their ranks. Many major multinational mining companies have insufficient risk-educated geologists, mining engineers, geotechnical engineers and/or metallurgists on their board or in their executive team. In some cases, these companies have had to defend themselves against class actions and/or regulatory action as a result of adverse outcomes, including incidents that could have been prevented by greater due diligence on geotechnical risk.
Moving forward, corporate governance thought leaders (e.g. AICD and proxy advisers) need to be educated. Understanding risk in mining requires technical and operational expertise in mining engineering, life-of-mine planning, geotechnical engineering, geology and metallurgy. These professionals need to work alongside traditional risk practitioners and assurance providers to develop new ways to provide transparency, accountability and assurance to mining company boards.
